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Abstract 
 
If we take seriously literal interpretations of quantum theory and general relativity then the question 
posed in the title is no. This article highlights where incompatibilities arise by considering our experience 
in the context of modern physics. Implied nonmaterial minds possess properties that no physical entities 
do by being both transtemporal and localised in the configuration space. The principle of localisation 
(PL) is proposed, and is used to show that there is no need to resort to the Everett interpretation to show 
that minds exist outside of physics, post relativity physics is enough. However, in this regime, there is no 
free will, minds are destined to experience a pre-determined but unknown future. Free will is restored 
when we reinstate pure wave theories in line with Everett. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been a longstanding philosophical problem in reconciling the consequences of 
modern physical theories with our everyday experience of the world around us. This apparent 
inconsistency can be addressed by considering the conflicting viewpoints as independent 
postulates in order to see what lessons can be drawn. These postulates can be stated as 
follows 
 
P I Eternalism: Physical reality consists solely of a timeless wave function over a 
universal configuration space. 
 
This asserts the underlying static nature of material reality of which physical time is just one 
variable. The second postulate is equally important and addresses the subjective nature of our 
experience, this reads: 
 
P II Experience: Our conscious dynamic experience of the world is real. 
 
A likely cause of this inconsistency is the physicalist position that is tacitly assumed, where 
the experience leading to the second postulate is claimed to be an illusion. Elucidating the 
contrasting properties of minds and the material of the universe they find themselves in 
provides an important first step in extricating ourselves from this difficulty. The universal 
wave function, which encapsulates the material universe, has the properties of being timeless 
and distributed over the classical configuration space (C-space). By contrast minds are 
localised and dynamic within C-space, as we experience ourselves to be. This localisation is 
deduced directly from our common experience of a single classical configuration at any 
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instant. This is the principle of localisation (PL), and is an idea that evolved from localisation 
of consciousness in the Hilbert space of quantum theory (Zeh, 1970, p74).  
 
A significant first step in this direction was due to Albert and Loewer (1988), which had the 
aim of reconciling Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics (Everett, 1957) with 
everyday experience. This has been supported by subsequent work with respect to the new 
dualism, for example (Bitbol, 1990; Squires, 1993; Hemmo and Pitwosky, 2003). Despite 
these authors’ agreement on dualism, their respective interpretations of minds do differ. For 
example Squires’ approach introduces the concept of a universal mind in contrast to the many 
minds of Albert and Loewer. However, in this work it is not my purpose to discuss the 
configuration of minds and how they may relate to each other or to the physical world, it is 
only to show their independent existence. I do this by appealing, not just to the Everett 
interpretation but also to modern physics as a whole.  
 
The work of these authors, being written in the context of the Everett interpretation, provided 
reasons for others, possibly with physicalist leanings, to attempt a refutation of Everett, 
examples include (Byrne and Hall, 1999; Adler, 2014). While others, for example 
(Lockwood, 1996; Deutsch, 1996; Saunders, 1998; Greaves, 2004; Lewis, 2007) instead try 
to maintain a physicalist position in the face of Everett. In what follows I show that this is not 
possible. Moreover, it is shown that that mind-body physicalism is untenable in all post-
relativity physics as interpreted at face value. 
 
There are two key concepts, already mentioned, that need to be addressed in order to see the 
distinctness of minds and the physical world. These are (i) the timelessness and extended 
distribution of the wave function and material objects it encapsulates, and (ii) the localisation 
and movement of minds. In the following section I discuss timelessness by showing how 
physical time emerges from an essentially static reality. This is done by summarising the 
problem of time in the context quantum gravity, and then to show how classical1 relativity can 
also be considered as a timeless system. Provided a reader, unfamiliar with the physics, 
accepts an eternalist’s interpretation of time (e.g. B-theory (McTaggart, 1908)), then this 
section can be safely skipped without compromising the message.  
 
Physicists tend to picture the physical world in terms of world lines in space-time that are 
branched in the Everett interpretation, which philosophers call this worm theory. However, an 
alternative view called stage theory (Sider, 1996; Tappenden, 2017; 2019) is introduced in 
section 3 in which the worms may be considered segmented. These segments or stages as 
they are called represent local features in C-space. Timelessness provides the groundwork for 
section 4 on consciousness and the principle of its localisation. Before concluding I include 
three more sections: section 5 on Papineau’s physicalist criterion (Papineau, 2001) and where 
it fails in the face of PL, section 6 dedicated to PL as applied to Parfittian examples (Parfit, 
1984) and section 7 revisits stage theory where we see some of the most powerful arguments 
favouring a purely physical metaphysics, without denying postulate P I. Here I show that 
there is still a residue of a nonmaterial conscious entity. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Here the word “classical” is used to indicate that we are not considering quantum mechanics. 
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2. Timelessness 
 
Here I provide a brief overview of modern physics, by which I mean physics post-special 
relativity. Before relativity the state of physics was such that the scientific community could 
not easily decide between presentism and eternalism, a debate dating back to Heraclitus and 
Parmenides c. 500 B.C. Generally due to the way language had evolved, time was tense 
dependent, so the way people thought about time could, more easily be represented by A-
theory, which is more consistent with Bergson’s (1910) position. From a Newtonian 
viewpoint the ontology of time was not considered to have the same status as physical space. 
Essentially everything happened in 3ℝ  which represented the whole of physical reality in the 
present. The past did not exist, it was only remembered, and the future had not happened yet 
therefore that did not exist either. This is how Saunders (2002) for example, defines 
presentism2. Given the causal relationships of events in this scheme and the causal closure of 
physics, it is easy to see how this opened the door to physicalist views. Later I show that 
mind-body physicalism today is really nothing more than a relic from the pre-relativity 
paradigm.  
 
Much of the confusion about time is between physical time and its phenomenal counterpart 
(Bergson, 1910). In April 1922 Albert Einstein famously disagreed with the philosopher 
Henri Bergson over the nature of time. Einstein’s position was reflected in his theories of 
relativity, whereas Bergson pointed out that the cold objectivity of Einstein’s view could not 
account for time as experienced duration. Moreover in general relativity both past and future 
exist timelessly suggesting an unknown but predetermined future, which Bergson could not 
accept. In Bergson’s view the future must be open, and this is addressed by adopting the 
literal interpretation of quantum mechanics. One possible solution to this impasse was that 
neither Einstein nor Bergson considered that they were defending entirely distinct concepts. 
Einstein’s view of extended objective spatialised time, contrasted Bergson’s inner 
phenomenal time that we experience as duration. This view of time mirrors our dualistic 
nature as proposed here. 
 
Considering quantum mechanics, many philosophers attempt to preserve physicalism even in 
the context pure wave theories. For example Ismael (2003) points out the tendency of 
Everettians to invoke nonmaterial homunculi in order to solve the measurement problem. But 
as we will see they do this with good reason. Before delving into those reasons however, we 
need to consider pure wave theories in a wider context. These interpretations emerged as a 
result of efforts to describe the universe as a whole within a quantum context – all observers 
are internal to the system. When considering this, then as remarked by Deutsch (1996), the 
Everett interpretation is the only interpretation of quantum mechanics. That wider context is 
canonical quantum gravity (CQG), which appeared ten years after Everett. Described as its 
most disturbing feature, timelessness in the objective world is manifest when we express the 
short form of the Wheeler DeWitt equation (DeWitt, 1967; Zeh, 2007 and references therein) 
 
0H Ψ =                                                             (1) 
 
                                                 
2
 There is an alternative version of A-theory known as the “growing block”. This is where the past and present 
exist but the future does not. This version of A-theory, which strictly is a hybrid between eternalism and 
presentism, still requiring a privileged present, is not discussed in this work; therefore here, the terms ‘A-theory’ 
and ‘presentism’ are interchangeable. 
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and realise that no time variable is present in the arguments of the universal wave function, 
Ψ . A central question to be addressed is: given the timeless nature of physical reality how is 
it that we experience change? We are able to give a partial answer here, for further details see 
(Austin, 2020a, mainly chapter 10).  
 
The Wheeler DeWitt equation can be compared with the standard Schrodinger equation 
 
i H
t
ψ ψ∂ =
∂
ℏ                                                          (2) 
 
where ψ  is the wave function for a particular microscopic system being analysed. Here we 
see an obvious time dependence of ψ . The form of Schrodinger’s equation, (2), would be 
typically used in a laboratory setting to analyse the behaviour of a particular experiment. 
When a WKB ansatz is inserted into an expanded form of equation (1) the Tomonaga-
Schwinger equation, is obtained (Zeh, 2007, p190). Using this and taking χ  as the pre-
exponential factor in the WKB form we obtain 
 
 
matter
di H
d
χ χ
τ
= .                                                   (3) 
 
In units where 1=ℏ  the similarity in form between (3) and (2) is striking. Here the time 
parameter, τ  is what Zeh calls many fingered time (or what relativists call proper time). But 
taken in a wider context it is nothing more than a real valued parameter on a Bohmian 
trajectory through C-space. This provides a rudimentary but effective idea of how physical 
time emerges from a timeless universe. Moreover, a simple way of seeing the timelessness of 
CQG is to eliminate the time dependence of ψ  in (2) ( 0tψ∂ ∂ = ), and see that it 
immediately reduces to the form of equation (1). 
 
A question prompted by this conclusion is: if time does not exist at a fundamental level then 
is there something else to replace it? There is, it is the configuration space itself, also called 
the universal C-space. Unlike time with topology ℝ , C-space is for all practical purposes 
infinite-dimensional. It is in C-space, C, that the Everettian multiverse resides in the form of a 
branching wave function. The topology of physical reality can then be represented by C X× , 
where X is the topology of the base space (most likely 3S  or 3ℝ ). This product space may 
also be called space-C, where C-space, “C”, replaces “time” in space-time (Austin, 2020a, 
section 6.5.4). What we think of as time is reduced to a single parameterised path with 
topology C⊂ℝ , which is no more than an ordered sequence of configurations. For further 
details of emergent time see (Barbour, 1999; Zeh, 2007), and for more general treatments of 
CQG see (Rovelli, 2003; Thiemann, 2007).  
 
To summarise, physical time is just the C-space path of the entire universal base space, X, 
and all of its matter contents through its own configuration space. Moreover it is possible to 
isolate a particular path in C-space, to obtain a structure with topology X×ℝ . This is what 
we perceive as classical space-time and time is just another coordinate in the geometry. We 
no longer have the presentism described by Saunders where time is just something 
ontologically distinct from space. This is how timelessness manifests itself in classical 
relativity – time is within physics. 
 5 
 
I have, admittedly on a very basic level, shown how the classical block space-time of general 
relativity is derived from the Wheeler DeWitt equation. The perdurance of physical time has 
inescapable consequences for conscious minds. Time in eternalism is tenseless. As a 
consequence we can say that past events exist (deliberate present tense). In classical relativity 
both past and future events exist, they are just elsewhere in C-space. We can illustrate this by 
a simple thought experiment, involving the relativity of simultaneity, which has become 
known as the Andromeda paradox (Rietdijk, 1966; Putnam, 1967; Penrose, 1989, p201). 
 
Consider Alice and Bob, walking along a street in opposite directions. The constellation 
Andromeda just happens to be on the horizon in the direction that Alice is walking. On a 
planet in the Andromeda Galaxy (M31), 2.4million light years away, there is an event, EA, 
simultaneous to Alice when she passes Bob. Similarly we may consider an event, EB, at the 
same location on that distant planet simultaneous to Bob when he passes Alice. Intuitively EA 
and EB are the same event. Relativity denies this; actually EB occurs approximately nine days 
earlier than EA assuming a relative velocity between Alice and Bob of 3 ms-1. We can 
consider a third event, E0, exactly half way between EB to EA, which will be repeated many 
times in both a backward and forward time sense for Charlie who walks in a circle just across 
the street from Alice and Bob as they pass each other. Despite this being beyond direct 
experience, due to the spacelike separation between events here and in M31, this thought 
experiment indicates the perdurance of E0 in support of eternalism. 
 
Another way to see how time emerges from timelessness, at a microscopic scale, is to include 
a clock in a closed quantum system that is in a static global quantum state. The clock in this 
case is just a subsystem possessing an associated time variable, correlated with the rest of the 
system. Page and Wooters (1983), with later refinements by Gambini et al (2009), have 
shown the possibility of creating a static entangled state with internal dynamics. An 
experiment by Moreva et al (2014) shows a static quantum state of two entangled photons 
when passing through birefringent plates that rotate the polarisation of individual photons. In 
one mode one of the photons was seen to evolve with respect to the other (the clock), that is 
their polarisations are correlated, while in another mode the collective state of the photon pair 
was observed to be static. 
 
One may ask if presentism can be dislodged entirely or whether it can represent the truth 
based on a hidden inertial frame that defines a universal present. In this way the universe may 
consist of a single three-dimensional space evolving dynamically where the models of a four-
dimensional block space-time, or a higher dimensional space-C, are entirely illusory. The 
only classical way I can think of to dispel such an idea would be to obtain direct evidence by, 
for example creating closed timelike loops. However, this approach seems unlikely to 
succeed (Hawking, 1992; Flannagan and Wald, 1996; Austin, 2020b). More direct evidence 
for the eternalist’s view however, does present itself via the empirically known existence of 
macroscopic-Bell states whose quantum volumes exceed the space-time extent of the known 
universe by many orders of magnitude (Iskhakov et al, 2012; Kanseri et al, 2013), for more 
detail see (Austin, 2020a, section 6.6). 
 
Although we can now see how internal dynamics can emerge from microscopic static 
systems, there is still something missing because there is no observer to experience the 
implied dynamic processes. Moreva’s experiment shows two variables that are correlated in 
an entangled system. It is like laying two rulers side-by-side and saying that their respective 
scales are correlated. Although we have a system that is physically complete, there is still no 
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pointer. It is like staring at a clock face with no hands. However, we are able to identify 
ourselves as pointers localised at a specific point in time for every instant. This is the 
principle of localisation. In the light of time being within the physics, a question that may be 
asked is: in what sense does the pointer move? Does it even need to move and if not can it be 
that we are a collection of static pointers along the world lines of our own bodies? 
 
 
3. Stage theory 
 
Before moving on to discuss minds and localisation of consciousness, it is worth considering 
an alternative to the way we have so far described timeless reality. Timelessness is variously 
referred to as eternalism, four-dimensionalism (in a non-quantum sense) or perdurantism (as 
opposed to endurantism as considered by presentists). However, there are two recognised 
ways to describe particular objects in the timeless world: worm theory and stage theory. From 
a physicist’s perspective (particularly in the context of relativity) timeless objects are often 
described as world lines possibly with past and/or future endpoints. It is also common for 
western philosophers to call world lines space-time worms, hence the designation worm 
theory. However, by continuing with a common analogy worms may be segmented where 
each segment is a stage. Therefore worm theorists consider world lines as fundamental 
objects whereas for stage theorists, time slices through a worm as are treated as separate 
individual objects temporally related to each other, and when it comes to us, each instant of 
our lives is considered as a separate person. 
 
Our description so far has been in the language of worm theory. However, a number of 
contemporary philosophers nowadays write in a way that is more consistent with stage 
theory, attributed to Theodore Sider (Sider, 1996), see also (Tappenden, 2019). Extending 
this idea to a pure wave interpretation of quantum theory, worms are viewed more like 
branched dendritic structures with each branch being divided into individual stages. This does 
not constitute any proposed change to the physics of what is being described. However, it 
does open the door to analytical philosophers with a physicalist bias to construct more 
powerful arguments in support of their theses. As we will see below one such author is Hilary 
Greaves (Greaves, 2004) who appears to use stage theory without reference to Sider 
(Tappenden, 2019, footnote 3). In stage theory persons are not transtemporal with a world 
line from birth to death constituting a whole life, instead each instant within that life is treated 
as a separate person. This is due possibly to each stage having a distinct physical/brain state 
having consequences that allow physicalists to construct models supporting mind-brain 
identity, ostensibly containing all of the ingredients required for mentality within each brain 
state. These issues will be addressed further in section 7. 
 
 
4. Nonmaterial minds and the principle of its localisation (PL) 
 
The principle of localisation is the theory that, at each instant, your mind contacts the 
physical world at one point in C-space – the focal point of consciousness. Therefore, you 
perceive your mind to be localised at one point in time at each instant. As an example, 
suppose you are meeting friends at a restaurant. You are a few minutes late. As you enter you 
accidentally stub your toe on the doorframe, it hurts. Resisting the temptation to let out an 
expletive, you proceed with a slight limp to the reserved table where your friends are already 
seated. Over a drink while waiting to order, you relate your recent experience to your friends. 
At this point, what can we say about the event when you stub your toe? This is an event in 
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your past, you have memory of it, in addition, the state of your nervous system and the tissue 
neighbouring the impact point is such that you are still feeling its effects. These effects are 
with you now. Taking a presentist’s view of time this event no longer exists. However, as we 
have already seen, it is eternalism that is favoured in the current scientific paradigm. 
Therefore the event where you stub your toe on the doorframe exists, it is just not where you 
are now. Even accepting eternalism, our common experience tells us that we only experience 
one instant at a time. That is in classical physics we really are localised in time, it is just that, 
unlike specific events, our locality moves with respect to our own phenomenal time – only 
minds change their configuration and state, this is a possible source of dynamic experience. 
In presentism, due to the non-existence of the past and future, minds are confined to the 
present, i.e. localised, but the present is privileged. Whereas for the eternalist there is no 
privileged present and no such constraint exists – the present is just where you are. In what 
follows we present further support for such a view while also considering alternatives. 
 
To relate this to physicalism, at the point where you experience stubbing your toe on the 
doorframe you, your mind, is at that point. Where you experience being seated with your 
friends, the event in question still exists. So the question that physicalists must answer is: 
what is the difference between an event when you experience it, and the same event when 
you refer to it later? For any eternalist this should be regarded as a legitimate question. In 
modern physics, the physicalist view implies that your mind could take the form of a 
localised physical disturbance, say a soliton or other type of localised wavepacket that moves 
along your world line in space-time in relation to phenomenal duration. The problem is that 
space-time is by definition static – physical time is internal to the physics. So no such 
disturbance can exist. Does this mean that we must deny our own existence? Obviously not 
but, if we identify ourselves as localised minds, we must take the bold step of denying our 
own physical existence, and regarding our bodies and brains as structures to which we are 
temporally associated. 
 
Our material bodies (and brains) are, unlike our minds, distributed over time. To use Parfitian 
language, our bodies are objects extended over time, with features that vary along with many 
overlapping connections (causal relations). All of the body’s features and connections 
collectively constitute a personal-identity-over-time. But because this structure is extended in 
time it is legitimate, given our common experience of localisation, to treat it as purely 
physical. This is precisely what Parfit does. However, in the light of PL it is difficult to see 
how physicalism can be maintained except possibly with the application of stage theory. A 
comment by Acton (1960) that in my view nicely summarises one motivation for physicalism 
(materialism), is quoted as 
 
The strength of the case of materialism is a result of the obscurities in the notion of a wholly 
incorporeal existence. This is held to be non-spatial and hence incapable of movement. But 
then its mode of operation on and with material bodies seems inexplicable. (Acton, 1960, 
p195) 
 
A key phrase here is …obscurities in the notion of a wholly incorporeal existence. Yes there 
are obscurities. However, the extension of physical bodies over time coupled with the 
localisation of minds is anything but obscure – the difference is manifest. With regard to the 
second sentence it is difficult to be sure what is meant by non-spatial. Focal points of 
consciousness are certainly localised in time (or in C-space), and our brains occupy small but 
well-defined regions of the base space to which our minds are associated. And it would 
appear that minds move in a more general space than just the base space. The last sentence 
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asserts the inexplicability of the effects on material bodies by minds. When we come to 
discuss Papineau’s criterion it will be seen that this point is wholly irrelevant. 
 
One of the strongest proponents of physicalism in the context of modern physics, specifically 
of the Everett interpretation, is Michael J Lockwood. In his (1996) article he attributes minds 
as branching entities just like features of the wave function. From someone presupposing 
physicalism this is to be expected. He describes your multimind (Mind) as being distributed 
across a local region of the multiverse (a subset of C-space) containing copies of you. Every 
copy has its own mind each of which is a branch of your Mind. He describes a 
superpositional dimension orthogonal to time over which various mental states are 
distributed. Together with time this forms an experiential manifold, within which each 
individual mind, including yours, occupies a vertical line (its own time). From each point you 
can look back via the faculty of memory, along your own timeline. Lockwood uses the 
analogy of tunnel vision. You can also look at other locations in base space to points in and 
on your past light cone via sensory input still within your own branch. Also, as Deutsch 
(1996) points out, you can gain input indirectly from neighbouring timelines via interference. 
All this describes the physics perfectly. However, when it comes to the interpretation of 
minds in the context of experience related to modern physics then Lockwood’s description is 
incomplete. But even Lockwood, when he refers to tunnel vision, alludes to PL – who or 
what is looking along the tunnel? 
 
Let us consider the tea/coffee example that Deutsch (1996) relates near the beginning of his 
supportive reply to Lockwood. As he was drafting his article he was experiencing drinking 
tea. Through his firm grasp of quantum theory he could also perceive a neighbouring timeline 
where he is drinking coffee. He did not experience drinking coffee at that point. That was the 
experience of a separate individual who has the same name, identical DNA and near identical 
biography. In addition there will be a branch point in his near past, to the past of which both 
David Deutschs (the tea drinking version and the coffee drinking version) followed identical 
paths through C-space. I myself am on Deutsch’s tea-branch because that is what is described 
in the copy of his article I have in front of me as I write. There will be many versions of the 
tea-branch, all subtly different, but I refer to them singly for reasons of clarity. There will be 
copies of me (physically) writing this article now but with the words tea and coffee switched, 
because those copies are referring to the article written by the coffee drinking David Deutsch. 
But those copies are not me because, in this life, I was not in that part of C-space. And when 
you read this article I will no longer be at the point where I am writing these words, I will 
have moved on because, although I am localised in C-space, I am moving through it along 
my own timeline as perceived with respect to my own phenomenal time.  
 
Lockwood’s view of minds fails PL. This is because, in his view, minds are subsystems of 
brains, which are static and distributed across extended subsets of C-space in the form of 
branching timelines. The reason given by Lockwood for this view is that he follows the 
principle of supervenience of the mental on the physical. He effectively presupposes 
physicalism. This is unconvincing; we cannot use physicalism to prove physicalism. 
However, I can offer a weaker form of the supervenience principle that does not demolish the 
consistency between eternalism and PL. Consider a body of water held in a container. We can 
say that the shape of the water supervenes on the shape of the container. This is not the same 
as saying that the water supervenes on the container. Here supervenience relates only to its 
shape. I can easily pour the water away, in which case the water and the container continue to 
exist separately.  Similarly we can say that mental states supervene on brain states; referred to 
as local supervenience (Austin, 2020a, p292). This makes sense because the state of a 
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particular mind can supervene on the instantaneous state of a brain at the corresponding point 
of its Bohmian trajectory. But it makes no sense to say that localised minds supervene on 
brains extended in C-space. Let us see how this further relates to the measurement problem.  
 
The measurement problem with respect to a two state quantum system, typically the spin-
state of an electron along a predefined x-axis, is often used when discussing the minds of 
interacting observers. A clear analogy, used by Peter Lewis (2007), is one of a forked road 
with each fork leading to different destinations. Consider Saunder’s (1998) argument 
regarding the measurement of the spin state of an electron emerging from a Stern-Gerlach 
apparatus. The electron is prepared in the state 
 
( )1 12 212 + −  
 
But when measured its state becomes either 12  or 12−  with probability of 12  for each case. 
In the forked road analogy the main road (pre-measurement) splits with one branch heading 
for Upton ( 12 ) and the other heading for Downham ( 12− ). Lewis considers the three 
options analogous to seeing the electron spin in: both states, neither state or, one or the other. 
These are Saunder’s three options (Saunders, 1998, p11). Any physicist will know that a 
classical observer will always measure the latter. In response to Saunders’ three options he 
states that just as the post-junction segments of a forked road are physically continuous with 
the pre-junction segment, then a pre-measurement person stage is continuous with its two 
post-measurement stages. In Lewis’ analogy the post-fork segments head for Upton and 
Downham to appropriately reflect the spin eigenstates of an electron after measurement. Here 
road1 is the road segment at 1x  before the fork whereas road2 ↑  and road2 ↓  are road 
segments at 2x  after the junction heading for Upton and Downham respectively. Then he 
makes the case for which is the appropriate question to ask. 
 
The analogous question in the road case is this: Which road (if any) does road1 become at x2? 
(Note that the question is not ‘‘Where will I get to if I drive along the road to x2?’’; the 
analogy is between the road itself and the Everettian person.) (Lewis, 2007, p3). 
 
The argument here is about which is the right question to ask. If you are a super-observer 
seeing the entangled state of the electron, apparatus and experimenter collectively, then the 
right question is, as Lewis states: Which road (if any) does road1 become at x2? However, if 
you are the experimenter, the right question, contrary to Lewis’ claim, is the one in brackets: 
Where will I get to if I drive along the road to x2? In other words what state of the electron 
spin will I experience seeing? Here we are appealing to postulate P II in the introduction. 
When considering internal observers the question is about their experience. The confusion in 
the analogy is between the road and the traveller. In the experiment the confusion is between 
the experimenter’s body/brain (the road) and the experimenter’s mind (the traveller). In order 
to avoid this confusion it is necessary to state whether we are referring to physical or mental3 
aspects. This is not some Rylean category mistake4 either; although minds are subjective their 
existence is an empirical fact. In this case it is our common experience that forces us to select 
                                                 
3
 Here ‘mental’ refers to a non-physical aspect, the minds perspective continuously changes but the physics does 
not. 
4
 Gilbert Ryle (1949): Ryle’s condemnation of dualism as a category mistake relies entirely on the causal 
closure of physics (page 8… of the 60th Anniversary addition). 
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the latter type of question rather than the former. Minds experience classical states because of 
their tightly defined locality in C-space. They never experience superpositions, and they do 
not normally experience temporally separated events at the same instant.  
 
Assertions by, for example Greaves (2004) and Ismael (2003), that nonmaterial minds are 
unnecessary to define local branching probabilities in a deterministic Everettian universe, are 
fine on a physical level. However, at a mental level the question: what will I experience? is 
very pertinent. Greaves (2004, p440) makes incompatible statements similar to Lewis’ with 
regard to experimenter, Alice, when measuring an electron’s spin state: 
 
…we get the following: the personal-identity-over-time relations among the person-stages 
are such that, according to our counterpart-theoretic account of talk of the future, Alice1 will 
become Aliceup2; and Alice1 will become Alicedown2. Similarly, Alice1 will see spin-up, and 
Alice1 will see spin-down. (Greaves, 2004, p440) 
 
The first sentence is about the physical situation, which is fine. In the second, however, 
Greaves makes a statement about experience. She refers to the minds of Alice1; “Alice1 will 
see…” But the Alice1 that sees spin-up is not the same individual as the Alice1 that sees spin-
down. They are distinct individuals that, up to the measurement, have travelled the same path 
in C-space. Greaves does adopt a similar position to Lockwood with regard to supervenience 
of the mental on the physical. Hence she presupposes physicalism. This is the reason she 
identifies the two sentences. We see that in an Everettian universe adopting a physicalist 
position can result in statements asserting that single individuals experience mutually 
exclusive events, contrary to common experience. 
 
From Ismael (2003) it is difficult to ascertain whether she adopts a physicalist position. She 
seems neutral on the point and her only concern is to show that probabilities calculated from 
the Born rule are independent of nonmaterial minds moving through the branches. There is 
no problem here. But she seems to believe that the reason Everettians postulate the existence 
of non-physical elements is to solve the probability problem in a branching histories context. 
It is not; it is because each non-physical element (a mind) is located at one point on one 
branch at any instant. Probability is a relevant topic but, as she shows, it is a natural part of 
the physics. 
 
At an abstract level we can regard physical reality as a set of correlated static scales, any one 
of which we could designate as a clock. However, by itself there is no pointer and we are left 
with a timeless, empty landscape. The pointer, required to complete the picture, is you. You 
are the pointer moving along the scales inexorably in the direction of increasing information, 
knowledge, entropy, Everett branching or whatever, at least during the period of your 
physical life. Consider the now famous quote by Hermann Weyl (1949) used by both 
Saunders (1998) and Zeh (2007)  
 
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, 
crawling upward along the lifeline of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a 
fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time. (Weyl, 1949, p116) 
 
Saunders describes the feeling of the passage of time as being tenacious, and interprets the 
above quote as Weyl’s attempt to dislodge it. I do not interpret Weyl’s statement that way, he 
simply says it as it is – the prior and subsequent passages in his book do not bear this out. 
Consider also Saunders’ subsequent statement 
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If my consciousness crawls up the life-line of my body, then it departs from one time, 1t  and 
arrives at another 2t ; in which case my body at 1t  has no consciousness,… But if it does not, 
then my consciousness is at both times at once, an absurdity.  (Saunders, 1998, section 4.2) 
 
In contrast, on the relationalist account, the movement of consciousness is already described 
by the life-line, in terms of the relations among its parts; nothing crawls up my life-line, my 
life-line already depicts change. (Saunders, 1998, section 4.2) 
 
The first paragraph describes the situation perfectly. The second describes the physics of the 
situation but not the experience of it. To say that nothing crawls up my life-line, is 
inconsistent with experience, but certainly nothing physical crawls up my life-line. Here 
Saunders seems to be confusing physical time with phenomenal time. Phenomenal time is, 
like other qualia, a function of one’s own mind; it is sometimes referred to as psychological 
time or experiential time. During our lives these two time parameters are monotonically 
related. As the statement, …is at both times at once, an absurdity., implies, it is not to be at 
both times at once, as Saunders clearly states; but the crucial point is that both times exist at 
once (eternalism), and consciousness is localised (PL), so at the instant when a mind contacts 
one point in physical time it cannot be at another. The only way to make sense of Saunders’ 
statement here is to deny eternalism. 
 
Relational theory is perfectly in tune with the physical landscape. However, the phrase 
…already depicts change., refers to the life-line of a person’s physical aspect. To say that 
something depicts change is not the same as saying that that something actually changes. I 
can draw a space-time trajectory of a particle on a blackboard complete with position and 
time axes, and say that it depicts a moving particle, while the picture itself remains still. 
Likewise a life-line can be perfectly static and yet still represent the experienced dynamics 
along its route. 
 
Saunders refers to my body having no consciousness in the past, and many find this idea 
unpalatable. But the body has no dynamics; it is part of a universal timeless landscape. Your 
experience of movement and change comes from your mind’s movement through that 
landscape. The so-called mindless hulk problem is a small price to pay when we consider that 
the branches of the wave function, and consequently our bodies and brains etc., form part of a 
timeless landscape that may be travelled repeatedly by many minds.  
 
There are those who will say that common experience is merely an illusion. Those that do 
need to have good justification for such a position. Examples cited often invoke the 
counterintuitive nature of relativity or quantum mechanics. So our common experience is also 
likely to be counterintuitive. But there is a distinct flaw in this kind of argument. The effects 
at the extremes where these physical theories are needed diverge significantly away from 
Newtonian predictions. In the Newtonian paradigm we would get an inaccurate model at the 
extreme scales and velocities where modern theories are applicable. As the earlier paradigm 
would demand, we would have extrapolated using Newtonian mechanics. The difference here 
is that it is the everyday world we are considering – there is no extrapolation. The reason we 
experience one instant at a time is because we are only associated with one point on the 
physical timeline at a specific instant of our phenomenal time. Similarly we do not see 
neighbouring Everettian branches because of our tight localisation in C-space; we are 
confined to one branch. 
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A separate but related issue to the one of conscious minds is free will. As we have seen, the 
discussion of the block space-time model of general relativity that encompasses eternalism is 
that, due to PL, minds have an independent existence from the physical. But in classical 
relativity there is only one pre-existing future. So conscious subjects are bound to experience 
a pre-determined but unknown future. It is not until we invoke quantum mechanics that we 
reinstate an open future that Bergson argued for. This is a consequence of the branching 
structure of the wave function in an Everettian universe. Through our choices and actions 
there is the feeling that we can affect the experienced world. But we do not affect anything in 
an Everettian context. However, we have a measure of control over the course of our 
Bohmian trajectory through C-space. This is summed up by the following sentence by 
Squires (1993) 
 
The conscious mind does not change physics, it selects from it. (Squires, 1993, p119) 
 
Squires goes on to speculate about the possibility of influencing quantum events in the 
outside world by choosing which branch to take when doing, say a spin-measurement. This 
would constitute a form of quantum telekinesis that, as Squires remarks, seems unlikely. But 
it does suggest two distinct classifications of branching event – those we can influence and 
those we cannot. It is likely that those that do fall under subjective influence are branching 
events in appropriate parts of the brain. Those in inappropriate parts, such as those governing 
autonomic functions and those in the outside world are categorised as being beyond our direct 
influence – these are purely stochastic. Tentative progress has already been made regarding 
branching events that may be subjectively influenced. It is speculated that coherent quantum 
states constantly form then decohere within microtubules in the neuronal structures of the 
brain (Hameroff and Penrose, 1996ab; Penrose, 1997 and references therein). This is likely to 
remain work in progress for many years to come. 
 
This section concludes with a few remarks regarding another possible motivation for 
physicalism. This is the tendency by physicists to want to unify their theories. Moreover 
unification is a likely motive for any form of monism. So what can we say about the 
discussion so far? A common feature within modern theories of mathematical physics is 
duality. Examples of pairs that are dual to each other include: vectors and one-forms in tensor 
algebra, electrical charge and magnetic flux in electromagnetic theory. Other examples are 
logical truth-values true and false, yin and yang in Chinese culture… The point is there are 
many instances where a unified whole can contain parts grouped as complementary pairs – 
duality. In the universal wave function we have an entity that is static and distributed over the 
whole of C-space. A mind by contrast is something that is dynamic with respect to its 
phenomenal time, and is localised. So we see aspects where mind and the wave function 
complement each other in certain ways. Whether they are dual to each other within some, as 
yet undiscovered unified scheme remains to be seen. But it seems sufficient to question 
unification as a serious motive for physicalism. 
 
 
5. Papineau’s physicalist criterion 
 
In this section I concern myself with another motivation for physicalism – causal closure. 
Previously mentioned motives include: the tendency for physicist to unify their theories, and 
obscurities concerning incorporeal existence, spatial location and the causal relationship 
between mind and matter (Acton, 1960). It is the latter, which is of most concern and the 
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established causal closure of physics seems to be the strongest motivation for physicalism 
(Papineau, 2001). In his essay The Rise of Physicalism Papineau summarises the physicalist 
argument as follows 
 
Premise 1 (the completeness of physics): 
All physical effects are fully determined by law by a purely physical prior history. 
 
Premise 2 (causal influence):  
All mental occurrences have physical effects. 
 
Premise 3 (no universal overdetermination):  
The physical effects of mental causes are not all overdetermined. 
 
Conclusion:  
Mental occurrences must be identical with physical occurrences. (Papineau, 2001, p9) 
 
To deny the conclusion we must deny at least one of the above three premises. If we are 
unable to do this then we must accept the physicalist’s conclusion. In the context of this work 
and given the current state of physics, we accept causal closure (premise 1), thereby relieving 
ourselves of the burden of challenging this premise. Turning our attention to premise 3 for a 
moment it is also reasonable that experienced physical effects due to mental causes are not 
overdetermined. Here we may imagine a physical effect in the brain having both a physical 
cause and a separate mental cause, this would be overdetermination. One might ask what the 
result would be if these causes were in conflict. However, since it is my intention to accept 
premise 3 also, then such a conflict has no relevance. Therefore if we are to deny physicalism 
then we must challenge premise 2. 
 
Premise 2 states: All mental occurrences have physical effects, whereas the quote by Squires, 
in the previous section, states: The conscious mind does not change physics, it selects from it. 
Certainly in the context of the Everett interpretation we have denied premise 2. Also we have 
seen that the classical block space-time is timeless implying that it cannot be changed either. 
So the conscious mind does not change the physics, it merely moves through it. However, in 
our discussion of free will we find that in classical physics there is only one pre-determined 
future. We need the Everett interpretation to allow free will as well as a dualist interpretation 
of mind. As was mentioned in the previous section, Acton’s quote, But then its mode of 
operation on and with material bodies seems inexplicable., has been shown to be irrelevant 
since minds have no effect on the pre-existing physical landscape. The real weakness in the 
physicalist argument is premise 2, and is easily denied in the current paradigm.  
 
 
6. Parfitian examples 
 
Here we consider some of the consequences of what has been said so far in relation to a 
selection of well-known thought experiments (Parfit, 1984). These were designed by Derek 
Parfit to test his own reductionist ideas regarding personal-identity-over-time. Although he 
writes like a physicalist he does state that physicalism is not a requirement of reductionism. If 
reductionism is applied only to physical systems, then reductionists can be dualists as well 
(Parfit, 1984, p241). This way we know that Parfit is applying his ideas only to physical 
systems. So we might expect similar types of statement as those from Lewis, Greaves and 
Saunders for example. Although Parfit does not consider quantum mechanics and its 
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Everettian consequences, some of his thought experiments do consider structures that 
bifurcate in time, which makes them very pertinent.  
 
Teleportation: The first of Parfit’s scenarios concerns a simple teleportation between Earth 
and Mars. The subject about to be teleported is concerned that when he is disintegrated at the 
Earth based station he will simply die and be replaced by a reintegrated copy at the Mars 
station. Post teleportation the copy is physically identical, at atomic resolution, to the 
original. He even notices the small cut on his top lip from his morning’s shave. It seems 
plausible that a physicalist would have no need to worry about such a process. But how 
would a dualist react? Would an associated mind (what Parfit calls a separately existing 
entity) permanently detach from the physical world at the point of disintegration, or would it 
remain associated with the subject’s body pattern as it is stored in the buffer, transmitted over 
a few tens of millions of miles as a radio signal, re-buffered and reintegrated at the Mars 
station? The honest answer is that we do not know, but PL does allow for both options. So, 
even if we could prove beyond doubt that minds do exist independently, then we do not know 
enough to be able to say whether a nonmaterial mind could remain associated with a body’s 
blueprint undergoing the hypothetical process of teleportation. For the sake of argument let us 
suppose that it can. We are now in a position to consider Parfit’s branch-line case. 
 
The ‘branch-line’ case: In this scenario the subject is teleported using updated scanners and 
replicators. The Earth based scanner malfunctions leaving the departing subject intact while a 
copy is reintegrated as normal at the Mars station. The original teleportee is told that the 
malfunction has also induced a heart condition and that his life expectancy is now no more 
than a few days. Should the original be worried? 
 
Given what we have said regarding localisation of minds it is likely that the reaction would 
be one of shock and eventually melancholy, the only consolation being that there would be an 
identical copy to continue his life. Parfit uses this scenario to decide what is important, 
personal-identity-over-time (PIOT), or relation R with any cause (R). Here PIOT requires 
psychological continuity, where continuity has the right kind of cause, and there is no 
branching. For relation R we merely drop the no-branching condition. For Parfit it is relation 
R that is that matters, not PIOT (conclusion 4, p217) because he is arguing for an impersonal 
view of reality. He goes on to argue that, of his four conclusions, three (2-4) follow from 
conclusion 1 (p217), where the first sentence of conclusion 1 is 
 
We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies, and various 
interrelated physical and mental events. (Parfit, 1984, p216) 
 
This is the main statement of conclusion 1. Like many physicalists it is likely that this 
conclusion is derived, at a deeper level, from the causal closure of physics (Papineau’s 
premise 1). Despite this he does introspect and admits some doubt about is 
reductionist/physicalist conclusions. Further on, in an imaginary situation where he is just 
about to teleport himself, he quotes 
 
But I expect that I would never completely lose my intuitive belief in the Non-Reductionist 
View. It is hard to be serenely confident in my Reductionist conclusions. (Parfit, 1984, p280) 
 
One possible reason for this is that a small part of himself is aware of his own localisation 
(PL) and that he is living in an age where eternalism underlies the prevailing paradigm of 
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physics. But because he appears wedded to physicalism it is not surprising that he arrives at 
the conclusions that he does. 
 
Another quote from Parfit that seems very appropriate here is where he writes 
 
I have conceded that the best-known versions of the Non-Reductionist View, which claims 
that we are Cartesian Egos, may make sense. And I have suggested that, if the facts had been 
very different, there might have been sufficient evidence to justify belief in this view. Some 
who believe in Cartesian Egos do not connect them, in such ways, to observable facts. (Parfit, 
1984, p228) 
 
Here Parfit leaves the door slightly open to a dualist position and concedes that it makes 
sense but then claims that there is insufficient evidence for it. In other words there is no 
evidence against it. From what has been said it seems that there is more than ample evidence 
for a dualist position. The observable fact that we only experience one point in time at any 
instant (PL) coupled with more than a century of modern physics supporting an eternalist 
theory of physical time entails the inescapable conclusion that minds and matter are distinct 
entities.  
 
In hindsight, if you are a physicalist it is not difficult to see how Parfit arrives at the 
conclusion that relation R takes precedence over PIOT. After all, in both teleportation 
scenarios, the straightforward case and the branch-line case, there is still a surviving copy of 
the teleportee. If you are a dualist, however, you are constrained to treat both post-branch 
copies as separate individuals. I believe most people would regard it as sad that one of the 
branch line copies only has a few days to live. What consequences does PL have for Parfit’s 
other examples? 
 
Divided minds: Physicalists and reductionists frequently cite the divided mind scenario as 
empirical justification for their position. Here we claim exactly the opposite, the results of 
these surgical procedures fit in very nicely with our dualists PL model. To summarise, the 
first paragraph of Parfit’s section 87 reads 
 
Some recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View. 
Human beings have a lower brain and two upper hemispheres, which are connected by a 
bundle of fibres (the corpus callosum). In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, 
surgeons have cut these fibres. The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by 
confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had 
other unintended consequences. The effect, in the words of one surgeon, was the creation of 
‘two separate spheres of consciousness’. (Parfit, 1984, p245) 
 
In essence it was found that the left hemisphere received sensory input from sense organs on 
the right and controlled the right hand half of the body via motor function, the right 
hemisphere having a similar relationship with the left half of the body. During tests where the 
visual field was appropriately split it was found that the separate spheres of consciousness 
were completely unaware of each other, except maybe indirectly via other sensory input. 
 
As previously implied, the relationship between bodies and minds is not one-to-one. There is 
always the possibility of many minds taking a path through one body – hence Albert and 
Loewer’s position. To borrow Lewis’ road analogy once again, we can think of the surgical 
procedure described above as a single one-way road suddenly becoming a dual carriageway, 
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where the severed corpus callosum is represented by the central reservation. A nonmaterial 
mind will always be associated with one and only one hemisphere, and a mind confined to 
travelling the timeline of one hemisphere would always be unaware of the activity of the 
other. 
 
The physics exam: We have just described the fission of a mind through a surgical procedure. 
What Parfit does next is another thought experiment where this procedure is reversible – 
fusion. For this he uses the imaginary scenario of a physics exam. As a candidate he is at the 
point of answering his last question with fifteen minutes remaining. He has a device 
implanted, which through manipulation of his eyebrows, allows him to shut off then re-
establish communication across his corpus callosum. Realizing that there are two ways to 
answer this question, for ten minutes he divides his mind assigning the longer calculation to 
the left hemisphere, and the other to the right. In the remaining five minutes he reunites his 
mind. This is how he describes it 
 
My work is now over. I am about to reunite my mind. What should I, in each stream, expect? 
Simply that I should suddenly seem to remember just having worked at two calculations, in 
working at each of which I was not aware of working at the other. This, I suggest, we can 
imagine. And, if my mind had been divided, my apparent memories would be correct. (Parfit, 
1984, p247) 
 
This makes perfect sense. I can imagine being one nonmaterial mind associated with one 
hemisphere only. Then when the corpus callosum is re-established. I would suddenly have all 
the memories from the other hemisphere available. And, assuming nonmaterial minds are 
unable to carry memories, it would not be possible for me to remember which hemisphere I 
had occupied. So the dualist model described here is completely consistent with Parfit’s 
reductionist reasoning. We have reductionism applied to the physical world associated with 
the static structures of the brain. However, Parfit seems to have overlooked the simple 
experience of being at one point in time at each instant, and the fact that PL also implies that 
we can only occupy one hemisphere when the corpus callosum is severed. So what are the 
consequences for psychological branching? 
 
The sleeping pill: Parfit describes the situation succinctly in the first paragraph describing this 
case 
 
Certain actual pills cause retrograde amnesia. It can be true that, if I take such a pill, I shall 
remain awake for an hour, but after my night’s sleep I shall have no memories of the second 
half of this hour. (Parfit, 1984, p287) 
 
It is as though the half hour immediately before falling asleep is on a separate branch line, 
just like in the malfunctioning teleportation case. Parfit claims such similarity. Up to a point 
there are certain similarities, however, there are differences too. The main one is that there is 
no physical branching5. A nonmaterial mind still travels along one road, and there is no 
immediate dead end like there is in the teleportation branch line. The main feature in this case 
is a modification to the way memories in the brain are addressed. Memories, especially 
recently acquired ones, are strongly ordered in a way that is monatonic to physical time. So I 
could remember event A three quarters of an hour before going to sleep, but not event B a 
quarter of an hour before. I also recall event C immediately after waking up. So the actual 
                                                 
5
 I am ignoring Everettian branching here. 
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event ordering is ABC, whereas I only recall AC. The reason for this is because a physical 
structure in the brain, that would normally provide evidence that B took place, was disrupted 
as the drug took effect. These are nothing more than static features along the road that a 
nonmaterial mind travels. 
 
Series-persons: Another non-branching scenario, proposed by T Nagel (Parfit, 1984, p290), is 
where, beyond the age of 30, every person is subject to an annual disintegration-reintegration 
cycle using a scanning replicator. This hypothetical solution to immortality effectively 
reverses the previous year’s ageing while preserving the memories for that year. Essentially 
this is similar to the simple teleportation case described earlier. Again we cannot know 
whether a nonmaterial mind would remain associated with the brain state when it goes 
through stages of buffering and transmission. But if we make the same assumption as before, 
that it can, then this process is just a series of static features that a mind follows along this 
non-branching path. 
 
Token or type: Here Parfit discusses Williams’ considerations of a subject, Mary Smith, who 
undergoes a teleportation type process that disintegrates the original and materialises many 
copies. The copies are initially identical but as they continue their separate lives, their 
experiences, post-materialisation, will gradually diverge and they become increasingly 
individualised. 
 
This is reminiscent of realistic Everettian branching. Applying PL, it is clear that the original 
Mary Smith will experience becoming one of the copies. But, to use Parfit’s terminology, it is 
an empty question that enquires as to which copy the original will become. Considering 
Lewis’ road analogy again, Parfit and Williams (Parfit, 1984, p293) only consider the 
branching road, not the travellers (note the plurality). Any one of the travellers, pre-branch, 
can legitimately call herself Mary Smith, and for each one there will be a probability 
associated with each copy she could potentially become. These probabilities are solely 
dependent on the physical aspects of the situation. That is, dependent on the properties of the 
road junction not the travellers. The important point here is that each mind is confined to one 
path. So once a mind arrives on one of the branches its life experience will include the pre-
branch path and the branch it is currently on. The only difference between this situation and 
Everettian branching is that here the copies can communicate.  
 
 
7. Stage theory revisited 
 
In section 3, stage theory was briefly introduced and a working definition provided. In the 
following sections however, the idea of localised conscious minds is treated in the context of 
worm theory. This can open us up to the criticism that the worm view is too narrow a context 
for the consideration of a conscious mind or, at the very least, for an entity purporting to be 
localised. The main reason for this is that the stages in stage theory are themselves localised, 
both along the worm, and by being confined to a single worm. A stage therefore is entirely 
localised in a C-space and more generally in a space-C context. This has profound 
consequences for the definition of what we consider to be a person, which can be summed up 
in the following sentence 
 
…you, now, are not the person you were at noon yesterday. (Tappenden, 2020a).                (4) 
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This sentence nicely encapsulates the idea that persons occupy fixed points in physical 
reality. So from where do we get our sense of movement and change? The first thing to note 
is that physicalists focus on what is being called the person, or what Greaves (2004) calls 
person-stages, which are obviously fixed points. One way to side step this is to focus on that 
which is being addressed by the pronoun you. That is you are present now and you where 
present at noon yesterday. However, this does not say that something called you actually 
exists, it could just as easily be a device to make the sentence (4) intelligible, but it does 
provide a focal point for non-physicalists. So in a similar vein there is another simple thought 
experiment we could use. 
 
Consider a conscious observer watching a digital clock increment over a period of time. The 
clock starts at ‘00’ and increments every second: 00, 01, 02,… (Tappenden, 2020b). The 
clock reading and corresponding observer’s brain state is summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 1: Chronologically ordered clock-brain states. 
Clock reading Remembered readings Sensory view Future expectation 
00 ……… 00 01, 02, 03, 04… 
01 00 01 02, 03, 04, 05… 
02 00, 01 02 03, 04, 05, 06… 
03 00, 01, 02 03 04, 05, 06, 07… 
04 00, 01, 02, 03 04 05, 06, 07, 08… 
⋮  ⋮  ⋮  ⋮  
  
The observer’s brain state at each instant partly consists of a memory of past readings, a 
present sensory view and future expectations. Physicalists argue that not only is the present 
view captured via immediate sensory input but also a sense of time passing is generated 
through the memory of past readings and the way they are structured. It is certainly the case 
that the order of past readings is remembered as well as the readings themselves. Moreover 
the order of readings expected to come is also part of the overall brain state. So we can say 
with certainty that all of the relevant ingredients required for the cognitive function of the 
observer exist within the brain. Stage theory says that each clock reading marks a stage where 
the observer at each stage is a separate person. Therefore persons are localised, something 
that we have been arguing for throughout. Is there a way to counter this? Are we really just 
physical stages? 
 
If we step back and consider the whole timeline we still see a structure that exists timelessly. 
Moreover we can also focus on whatever the you-pronoun addresses in sentence (4). Now, in 
presentism we are used to seeing the present changing. But any patch of space-time, or space-
C does not change in a physical context. At this point we may introduce the notion of a 
metaphysical state. We choose a patch of space-C that includes the clock and the observer 
with the clock in one particular state. Let us say that the clock state is ‘02’ and call the 
corresponding patch of space-C “R02”. Although we know that the physical state of R02 
cannot change, we can ask about its metaphysical state. Here we may ask the question: what 
is the difference between the metaphysical states of R02 when the observer experiences 
seeing 02 and when she sees some other clock state? In order to claim a metaphysical 
difference it is sufficient to say that when the observer sees 02 then her consciousness is 
present in R02, whereas when she sees some other reading her consciousness is not in R02. 
Therefore the metaphysical state of R02 changes by virtue of a change in metaphysical 
content and yet there is no physical change in the state of R02. It is the consciousness of the 
observer that the you-pronoun addresses in sentence (4) and you that experiences particular 
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events. Some philosophers identify an event with its experience and some physicalist 
doctrines are based on this, see for example (Manzotti, 2019). However our description in a 
space-C context denies this entirely – events need a witness in order to be experienced. So we 
have shown that persons, in a stage theory context, are localised but unlike a mind’s focal 
point of consciousness they are not transtemporal. The focal point of consciousness has the 
unique property of being both localised, in a general space-C context, and transtemporal. 
 
 
8. Summary 
 
The apparent inconsistency between physical theories, as they have developed over the last 
century and our experience of the world around us, has been a longstanding issue. The reason 
for this is because scientists and philosophers of science have, for the most part, adopted a 
physicalist approach to the problem. This is most manifest when Everett’s interpretation of 
the quantum universe is invoked. All of the possible evolutionary paths for the universe as a 
whole actually exist, however, we only experience a fleeting glance of one classical branch 
during our lives. If we assume physicalism this conflict cannot be resolved, because there is 
nothing to single out a focal point of consciousness. In physicalism we have a nice production 
of Hamlet without the prince of Denmark. This is also borne out when we carefully examine 
the situation in a stage theory context. 
 
When we consider classical general relativity, this supports an eternalist’s theory time, which 
considers that all events throughout space-time exist timelessly. At any instant of our 
experience, however, we are at one unique point in time. This is the principle of localisation 
(PL), which is directly inferred from our common experience (postulate P II). If we embrace 
a physicalist position then we need to explain how we experience phenomenal change. Stage 
theorists make a valiant attempt to do this but ultimately there is still a localised, 
transtemporal residue that never goes away. Modelling classical physics using eternalism 
(relativity) implies dualism but not free will. Free will is reinstated with the open branching 
structure implied by the Everett interpretation. 
 
The strongest motivation for physicalism is likely to be the causal closure of physics, which 
was established during a period before the advent of relativity when neither presentism nor 
eternalism of time held sway. The prevailing physics coupled with the way our language is 
structured suggested the presentist’s view as a natural way of thinking, from which we could 
trivially deduce PL 
 
Presentism PL.⇒  
 
Post relativity, eternalism became part of the new paradigm but our experience of localisation 
in time remained. Eternalism coupled with PL denies physicalism. The relevant logical 
relationships can be summarised as 
 
Postulate PL
Postulate Eternalism
PL Eternalism Physicalism.
P II
P I
⇒
⇒
∧ ⇒ ¬
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Our experience of change is a direct consequence of our movement between distinct points in 
C-space. But the elements that move cannot be of a material nature because the physical 
universe is, at root, timeless. 
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